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Thinking Mythologically: Black Hawk
Down, the “Platoon Movie,” and the
War of Choice in Iraq
Richard Slotkin
1 In January 2002, five months after Nine-Eleven, the movie Black Hawk Down opened in
theaters.
F0
A0 Many saw its  account  of  a  failed  Ranger  mission in Somalia  as  a  graphic
warning that  Third World interventions  can become military nightmares.  The Times’
Nicholas  Kristof,  who favored humanitarian interventions elsewhere in Africa,  hoped
viewers would not come away thinking all such missions were bad ideas.i 
2 Be careful what you wish for. When President George W. Bush screened Black Hawk Down
at a White House dinner that same month, he and his advisors drew a very different
lesson. As Newsweek later reported, “Bush . . . told his aides that America’s hasty exit from
Somalia after 18 soldiers died in the 1993 raid made famous in the movie ‘Black Hawk
Down’ emboldened America’s terrorist enemies” and so led directly to al Quaida’s attack
on September 11.ii Bush later invited twenty Congressmen to a screening—Black Hawk
Down was official Washington’s “must-see movie.” A few weeks later Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld told the Times that US intervention in Afghanistan was not “Black Hawk Down
in the snow,” because this time “the United States of America did not decide to withdraw
and leave the field.” The administration was then planning to invade Iraq; and it hired
Jerry Bruckheimer—producer of Black Hawk Down—to advise it on ways of controlling the
Somalia metaphor going forward. Despite all that would go wrong in Iraq, three years
later the President still read the movie as a warning that failure to persist in the use of
military force is a sign of weakness and an invitation to enemy attack: “The historical
analogy that is truly burned into Bush’s brain . .  . is Somalia”—that is, the “Somalia”
fiasco as interpreted in Black Hawk Down.iii 
3 The President, Rumsfeld, and even Kristof were “thinking mythologically.” They were
interpreting  a  crisis  using  symbols  drawn  from  a  work  of  fiction—a  fiction  whose
persuasive  power  derived,  not  only  from  its  own  sensational  imagery,  but  from  its
resonance  with  the  larger  system  of  symbols  and  historical  fables  which  constitute
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American national mythology. Moreover, the myth specifically invoked was one whose
original  form was established in cinema,  in the genre Jeanine Basinger has  properly
identified as the World War II Combat Film, but which has become popularly known as
the “Platoon Movie.” 
4 To appreciate the ideological  force in the symbolism of  Black Hawk Down we need to
understand the general nature and function of national myths, and their relation to the
genres of mass culture narrative; and to trace (in summary) the evolution of form and
content in the Platoon Movie genre through two phases: the creation of the “Good War”
myth, and of an American “war imaginary,” from 1942 to 1960; and the recuperation of
that myth from the disrepute into which it fell after the American defeat in Vietnam. 
 
National Myth and the Role of Genre
5 When  we  identify  as  nationals,  we  join  what  Benedict  Anderson  calls  an  “imagined
community” or in Etienne Balibar's formulation a “fictive ethnicity.” The modern nation-
state is a political artifice, through which ethnically different communities are united
under a regime of civil law. The varied constituents of the nation have to be taught to
think of  themselves as a singular “People,” and to value that identity with or above
family, community, religion or dynasty. Nation-building elites have drawn on history and
folklore to create plausible fictions of a common history—that is, myths—through which
Bavarians and Prussians  can identify  as  German;  Bretons and Provençaux as  French;
people of Irish and African and German ancestry as American.iv 
6 Like the pearl in the oyster, myths develop around points of continual irritation—the
ideological  conflicts  that  characterize  a  particular  political  and  social  order.  Thus
American myths continually agitate questions of individual freedom and political power,
nature versus civilization, and above all, the conflict between civil equality and racial
exclusion.  Moreover,  a  myth is  also  a  script  for  action.  Its  heroes  model  a  political
response to crisis which the audience is invited to emulate—or at least consent to. But
every use of a myth is also a test of its validity, which may require believers to adapt their
mythology  in  light  of  new  experience.  The  history  of  a  myth  (or  of  the  genres  of
expression  that  carry  it)  is  therefore  the  account  of  a  continuous  dialogue  between
repetition and adaptation.v 
7 Most national  mythologies were laid down in print media,  as histories,  polemics and
generic forms of literary narrative, reinforced by various kinds of public spectacle. But
cinema provides a uniquely powerful medium, combining the authority and sensuous
appeal of the visual with the sustained intellectual coherence of narrative. In twentieth
century  America,  movies  and  television  became  the  primary  sources  of  symbolic
reference  and  of  the  narrative  tropes  through  which  people—or  Americans  as  “a
People”—characterize their  experience.  The recurrent narrative patterns that  we call
“film genres” reflect persistent preoccupations of our culture; and some of these, which
engage questions of national identity, national purpose, and state power, are vehicles of
national mythology. No genre is more obviously engaged with these issues than the war
film,  for in war the power of  the state is  openly displayed,  and citizens are at  once
spectators, subjects and agents of state power.vi 
8 Historians can trace the course of change in national culture and politics by mapping
changes in the genres that carry its myths. But to use this information the historian must
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understand the original  and normative forms of  the genre,  as  a  base-line or  control
against which to measure changes over time. 
 
Origin and Basic Form of the Platoon Movie Genre,
1917-1945
9 The “Platoon” type of war film developed between 1942 and 1945 was both an innovation
in the cinematic treatment of war, and a radical innovation in national mythology. 
10 Our oldest myth is the Myth of the Frontier, which “explains” American nationality as the
product of two centuries of “savage” wars, through which “Americans” conquered and
settled a wilderness rich in resources,  undergoing a “regeneration through violence”
which made them a people exceptionally prosperous, democratic, virtuous and heroic.
The Frontier Myth is a complex and still potent one.vii But for purposes of this discussion
the thing to bear in mind is that, in its original form, the Frontier Myth imagines America
as  a  “White  Republic,”  which  defines  itself  by  destroying  or  subjugating  non-White
enemies. 
11 The  Platoon  Movie  continues  this  essential  story-structure:  the  American  People  is
spiritually and politically regenerated through violent struggle against a savage enemy in
a  wild  or  chaotic  landscape.  However,  in  the  Platoon Movie  the  American People  is
represented by a military unit that joins diverse races and ethnicities in defense of the
nation. 
12 The basic elements of this new American story were introduced during the First World
War, before the Hollywood film industry was organized. The outbreak of war came at the
end of a forty year period (1877-1917) during which explicitly racialist ideologies had
displaced  the  presumptions  about  human  equality  that  had  been  the  hallmark  of
American liberalism. The shift was marked by the establishment of Jim Crow in the South
(with the consent of the North and West); and the growth of a racialist anti-immigrant
movement, centered in the Northeast and West Coast. Harvard President Lawrence Lowell
stated the core belief that united these movements: that “Indians, Negroes, Chinese, Jews
and Americans cannot all be free in the same society.” viii 
13 But the United States could neither recruit nor finance an army of millions without the
active participation of racial and ethnic minorities. The official ideologists of America’s
Great  War therefore offered them a new social  bargain:  recognition as  Americans in
exchange for wartime service. A wave of official publications now described the erstwhile
White Republic as a “vast,  polyglot community,” whose democratic ideal was “higher
than race loyalty, transcend[ing] mere ethnic prejudices,” to which every citizen might
rally “without losing hold upon the best traditions of . . . his race and the land of his
nativity.” Progressive or liberal aspirations to social justice were thus tied directly to
war-fighting nationalism.ix Racist animosity was projected outward against the Germans,
who were represented as ape-like Huns—imagery which drew on existing anti-Black, -
Jewish and -Asian racial stereotypes.x 
14 Once the war ended, the antipathies roused by racialist war propaganda reverted to these
traditional targets. Jim Crow was violently reaffirmed, and new policies of “race” based
exclusion  were  aimed  against  White  ethnics.xi But  over  the  ensuing  decades  the
politicization of the minorities, their memory of the promises made in 1917, their role in
the New Deal coalition, and—as war approached—the identification of racism with the
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Nazi and Japanese enemy, created the opportunity and the need for a renewal of the Great
War social  bargain.  This was the ideological context in which the Platoon Movie was
conceived.xii
15 The Platoon Movie was more than propaganda. It was a vision of the kind of nation that
Hollywood, acting as custodian of public myth, thought we should become. American
nationality is symbolized by a multi-ethnic and multi-racial military unit, pitted against
an  enemy  figured  as  racially  monolithic—either  a  “savage”  non-White  race  (the
Japanese), or an ideologically racist White nation (the Nazis). The platoon also defends
helpless  “natives”  menaced by  Japanese  or  Nazi  aggression—America  is  the  paternal
“liberator” nation, of peoples valued primarily as objects of rescue. 
16 These  films  explicitly  address  the  central  paradox  of  American  nationality:  the
persistence of racial inequality and exclusion in a supposed democracy. Almost every
movie platoon includes (among a range of ethnic types) a Jewish soldier from Brooklyn;
but what is to us a cliché was, in 1943, an explicit rebuke of the anti-Semitism that was
rampant in America through the 1930s and 40s. Even more striking was the way these
movies strained to include Black soldiers in on-screen platoons. The US Army in World
War  II  was  racially  segregated.  Hollywood  deliberately  set  reality  aside  to  create
allegories of racial integration. In two of the seminal works of the genre (Bataan and
Sahara [1943]) Black soldiers and White not only fight together, they drink from the same
canteen—this  in  a  country  where  segregated theaters  required  separate  drinking
fountains, in a year when large and violent race riots occurred in Detroit, New York, Los
Angeles  and other cities.  Hollywood’s  abiding concern with color-racism persisted in
films made after the war (e.g., Home of the Brave [1949], Steel Helmet [1951], Red Ball Express
[1952]).xiii 
17 The Platoon genre  is  marked by  a  number  of  formal  conventions,  to  which  Jeanine
Basinger’s book is the best guide. These recurrent features create the “genre effect”: they
enable later films to enrich their statements by playing upon the audience’s memory of
scenes and characters from earlier films. xiv Five elements of the form are of particular
importance in establishing the base-line against which important changes in symbolism
and ideology can be measured. 
18 The first  is  the roll-call,  which frames the platoon as a microcosm of  a multi-ethnic
America. Over time its constituents have altered to reflect changes in the way we see the
problem of inclusion: from careful representation of a range of White ethnic and regional
types (with some racial color) in World War II and Korea, to post-Vietnam units in which
Whites of different social types (hippies, red-necks, college boys) are joined with an equal
or larger number of Black and Latino soldiers.  Since 1986,  female soldiers have been
included to reflect changing gender roles. 
19 The second convention I call “the race-face.” The paradox at the heart of the Platoon
Movie is that Americans can only overcome their internal racism when attacked by an
enemy who is marked as racially extreme. Racialization of the enemy has always been a
prerequisite for mobilizing public opinion in support of war. That is to say: we imagine
that war is necessary when we recognize in an enemy the stigmata of race difference—a
seemingly organic, bred-in-the-bone animosity, arising from motives utterly alien to our
ways of thinking, and incapable of negotiated settlement. Platoon Movies address the
contradiction by having someone within the platoon who resembles the enemy testify by
his words or his mere presence to our racial good will. For example, in Bataan (1943) a
two-shot pairs a White soldier (Purckett) with a Filipino (Salazar), sharing gum and their
Thinking Mythologically: Black Hawk Down, the “Platoon Movie,” and the War of...
European journal of American studies, 12-2 | 2017
4
hatred of “Japs.” In Pork Chop Hill (1960) the use of the Japanese-American Lt.  Ohashi
offsets the dehumanized depiction of the Chinese enemy; and when the issue of Black/
White relations arises, the behavior of a problematic Black character is typically framed
with images of well-integrated and even heroic Black soldiers. 
20 The third convention is “the enemy’s lesson”: in order to defeat an enemy defined as
dirty and cruel, Americans must get in touch with what Obi-wan Kenobi and Dick Cheney
call “the dark side.”xv Our guide in this initiation is a tough-minded veteran, usually a
sergeant or junior officer—the war film equivalent of the Frontier Myth’s Hawkeye or
Daniel  Boone,  a  “White  Man Who  Knows Indians”  and  fights  “savages”  with  savage
methods. 
21 The fourth convention is  “unfinished business.”  The viewer is  enjoined—explicitly or
implicitly—to finish the job the Platoon has started, to learn the enemy’s lesson and win
the war. In the closing shots of 1943’s Bataan Sergeant Dane is the last living defender of
the vital outpost. The enemy appears as a crawling horror in the jungle fog. Dane senses
them, and screams his rage and disgust as he lays down annihilating fire. We do not see
his death. Instead a rolling title summons the audience to join the war effort that will
bring us “back to Bataan.” Variations on this “Sergeant Dane Moment” conclude most
combat films, sometimes triumphantly, sometimes as heroic sacrifice. They culminate the
violence that  has  pervaded the film,  and glorify  our  feeling of  revulsion toward the
enemy.xvi 
22 The fifth convention is the “desperate defense.” The “unfinished business” of the first
Platoon Movies was to rally the nation to overcome the defeats suffered by American
troops at the start of the Pacific War. They inevitably dramatized sacrificial last stands by
soldiers trying to win time for the nation to fully mobilize. But even later in the war, in
films dramatizing American offensives (Guadalcanal Diary [1943], Objective Burma [1945]),
what begins as an offensive often ends in a desperate defense against enemy counter-
attack. The predominance of defensive scenarios in the Platoon Movie symbolizes the
principle that our war is ultimately defensive in its motives. 
 
Evolution of the “War Imaginary,” 1945-1960
23 By dominating movie screens during and just after the war, the Platoon Movie shaped
Americans’ belief that the Second World War had been a “good war”: not only necessary
but inescapable, righteous in its aims and triumphant in its result. In retrospect, after the
experience of Korea and Vietnam, Americans would come to think of it as the Good War—
the  standard  against  which  all  others  are  to  be  measured.  This  is  a  strange  but
characteristically American way to remember a war which killed outright twenty million
soldiers and perhaps 40 million civilians;  which devastated all  of  continental  Europe,
Japan,  and  most  of  China;  which  produced  such  innovations  in  human  affairs  as
industrialized  genocide  and  the  systematic  annihilation  of  civilian  targets  by  fire-
bombing  and  atomic  bombs.  But  the  American  mainland  was  untouched  by  the
destruction; and the nation emerged from the war as the pre-eminent world military and
economic power. 
24 Moreover,  war-time  patriotism,  coupled  with  the  liberal  presumptions  of  anti-Nazi
ideology, gave new life to the “social bargain” that had first been offered back in 1917.
Instead of the racial and political reaction that had followed the First World War, the
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post-1945 period saw a re-energizing of the New Deal campaign for social justice. The
expansion of veterans’ benefits under the G. I. Bill of Rights provided education, housing
and health benefits on a massive scale, fostering a huge enlargement of the middle class;
and a new civil rights movement asserted African-American claims to these benefits, and
began the struggle to destroy Jim Crow.xvii 
25 The political strength of Black and ethnic elements in the New Deal coalition had a lot to
do with this; but they benefited from the public celebration of pluralistic nationalism by
Hollywood. As Gary Gerstle observes, in American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth
Century, “no narrative of nation building [was] more important” than the Platoon Movie
to the development of American society and politics in the post-war period.xviii Over time
it would help make “diversity” a hallmark of American nationality: so that on TV police
shows (for example)  we always see a team of  different races,  ethnicities,  classes and
genders—Hill Street Blues in the 1980s, NYPD Blue in the 90s, CSI and NCIS and others since
2000; and similarly diverse teams appear in shows set in work-places like law firms or
hospitals—although not usually in sit-coms like Friends or How I Met Your Mother. 
26 But the Platoon Movie made the case for diversity by linking it to the idealization of The
Good War.  The genre created what we might call  an American “war imaginary”—the
political ideals and aesthetic values US-Americans have in mind when they choose war.
With the start of the Cold War in 1948 the genre became a vehicle for imagining, and
questioning, America’s emerging role as a world power—for reconciling new wars with
the Good War ideal. 
27 The analogy was imperfect. Where World War II was a “war of necessity,” the Cold War
would involve “wars of choice,” undertaken for reasons of policy, to forestall threats that
were  distant  or  indirect.  Moreover,  the  new  wars  would  require  the  extraordinary
expense of lives and resources for goals that necessarily fell short of total victory. These
difficulties were reflected in films made during the Korean War (1950-52). Although early
films  (Steel  Helmet,  Fix  Bayonets,  One  Minute  to  Zero)  followed  the  Bataan scenario  of
dramatizing  heroic  defensive  stands,  their  imagery  is  pervaded  (both  literally  and
figuratively)  with  the  “fog  of  war,”  in  which  neither  general  war  aims  nor  tactical
objectives can be clearly seen. Retreat Hell (1952), the most prestigious of these projects,
begins by showing the Marines as rescuers of helpless Korean children. But victorious
liberation  gives  way  to  desperate  retreat  after  the  Chinese  attack  near  the  Chosin
Reservoir; and victory is redefined as simply getting all of our men safely home.xix 
28 The Cold War conundrum was not successfully resolved—cinematically or politically—
until 1959-60. Two excellent and important films, All the Young Men and Pork Chop Hill,
explicitly linked commitment to the sometimes dubious battle against Asian Communism
with the goal of racial justice at home. These films reflect the emergence of a “liberal
consensus,”  soon to  be  enacted  in  the  Kennedy  and Johnson administrations,  which
would link movements for social justice (civil rights, the War on Poverty) with a more
aggressive  response  to  Communist  advances  in  the  decolonizing  Third  World—
particularly in Vietnam. xx 
29 But both sides of the liberal consensus would be catastrophically discredited: the War on
Poverty by urban riots (1965-69) and the Vietnam War by growing evidence of its futility,
and ultimately by defeat. 
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Vietnam Syndrome and Deflection of the War
Imaginary, 1975-86
30 The Vietnam War was traumatic for American culture, in part because it violated the
expectations generated by the myth of the Good War. The Good War is necessary—forced
upon  us,  not  chosen.  Its  aims  are  righteous  and  its  methods  rational—means  are
proportionate to ends, and they produce a good result. But Vietnam was a war of ill-
choice, and there was a radical mismatch between its stated aim (to save the Vietnamese
from Communist invaders) and the means used to prosecute it, as represented by the
absurd explanation: “we had to destroy the city in order to save it.” The moral failure of
American policy was symbolized by the My Lai massacre, in which American infantry
murdered a village of women, children, and elderly non-combatants. Instead of rescuing
the natives, we slaughtered them. And then the war ended in defeat.xxi
31 Public  revulsion  against  these  failures  led  to  “Vietnam  Syndrome”:  the  extreme
reluctance  of  the people,  or  their  representatives,  to  support  any major  military
intervention. Vietnam Syndrome was blamed for the supposed weakening of American
foreign policy in the 1970s, under Presidents Ford and Carter. The movement known as
neo-conservatism began during  this  period,  as  policy  intellectuals  from both  parties
sought to revivify the American war imaginary by developing credible and appealing
scenarios for the use of military force.xxii 
32 Film-makers worked in a separate sphere, but their thinking paralleled that of the neo-
cons. They tried to re-imagine the scenarios of cinematic heroism in the light of post-
Vietnam disillusion. While it is impossible to treat all the relevant films in detail, it is
possible to trace the pattern and direction of developments in the production of war
films, which led to the rehabilitation of the Platoon Movie in 1986, and to the emergence
of a new war imaginary that found its most complete expression in Black Hawk Down. 
33 Hollywood had refused to imagine Vietnam. With the exception of John Wayne’s Green
Berets (1968), Hollywood made no movies explicitly about Vietnam while the war was on.
In the immediate aftermath, the industry invested in three films which tried to sum up
the war and put it to rest. Two of these were artistically ambitious epics, The Deerhunter
(1978) and Apocalypse Now (1979), and one an interesting low-budget Platoon Movie, The
Boys in Company C (1978). All three agreed that American tactics were stupid or crazy, and
the war itself futile. However, none dealt with the moral failure symbolized by My Lai.
Most of the atrocities shown in these films are committed by the enemy (Deerhunter) or by
our South Vietnamese allies (Boys in Company C). Americans also do evil or crazy things;
but these are seen to arise from a perverse learning of the “enemy’s lesson,” the result of
a kind of moral contagion which infects Americans and turns them to the “dark side.”
Colonel Kurtz in Apocalypse Now seems to “go native.” In Deerhunter the psychological
destruction of Nick is figured in his obsession with the “Russian roulette” game, which
the film (falsely) presents as a vice characteristic of Vietnamese culture. But scapegoating
the Vietnamese was not an adequate way of resolving the moral failure symbolized by My
Lai.xxiii 
34 Hollywood deflected its treatment of war into the realm of fantasy. One symptom of the
nation’s lingering trauma was obsession with the idea that American POWs were still
being held by the Vietnamese in secret camps, and that our government had knowingly
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abandoned them. In 1983 the movie Uncommon Valor turned this obsession into a viable
Platoon Movie: ten years after the war, a racially mixed group of former Green Berets
rescues POWs from a hidden camp in Laos. Between 1983 and 1988 Hollywood produced a
small subgenre of these rescue films including Missing in Action 1, 2 and 3 starring Chuck
Norris,  and Rambo Part  II,  starring Sylvester Stallone.  In effect,  these rescue-fantasies
were “do-overs,” in which the Americans symbolically win the war they actually lost. The
rescue  fantasy  did  offer  a  way  of  re-imagining  a  good  war:  instead  of  saving  the
Vietnamese, we are rescuing our own people—a mission to which no American could
object. But the victory is not truly national, because it is won in spite of the corruption
and moral cowardice of our government.xxiv 
35 A more popular and potent version of the war-fantasy was developed (after 1977) in the
new  and  increasingly  active  genre  of  science  fiction.  The  Star  Wars and  Star  Trek
franchises preserved Platoon Movie formulas—and recovered the moral élan of the Good
War—by  disconnecting  them  from  the  troubling  history  of  Vietnam.  These  films
universalize and abstract the Platoon theme: the good guys are always a federation of
spectacularly different races—Sulu and Uhura and the Vulcans; Wookies, Ewoks, Yoda—
united against aliens who assert racial singularity and superiority (like the Klingons or
the Borg in Star Trek) or are figurative Nazis (like the storm troopers in Star Wars).xxv But
until Aliens in 1986, none of these films directly addressed the trauma of Vietnam—the
race war gone wrong. 
36 Aliens was  the  sequel  to  Alien,  essentially  a  horror  movie  in  outer  space.  But  Aliens
combined horror elements with the structures of the Platoon Movie. A platoon of Space
Marines is sent to rescue colonists on the planet where the original Alien monster was
discovered. With them is Ripley, a female officer who was the sole survivor in the original
Alien film. She fills the role of the veteran who understands the Enemy. Instead of the
White Man Who Knows Indians, she is the White Woman Who Knows Monsters. Platoon
references begin when the Marines rise from their sleeping pods for a roll call. The mix is
typical  of  Vietnam-era  films.  It  includes  Whites  (not  ethnically  identified),  a  Black
sergeant, and two Latinos—but also two female Marines, most notably Vasquez, who is
physically  powerful  and  macho  in  style.  Gender  has  finally  joined  the  platoon.  The
Vietnam connection  is  emphasized  by  measuring  distances  in  “clicks”—the  standard
mileage unit in Vietnam—and by bits of dialogue, like the soldiers’ wish for “a stand-up
fight” and not another “bug hunt.” The distinction recalls the complaint in Vietnam, that
the enemy avoided open combat in favor of guerrilla warfare, and thereby suggests a
likeness between Vietnamese guerrillas and the subhuman space aliens. As in the POW/
MIA films, the mission is to rescue our own people; and the government (represented by a
treacherous agent of the colony-building corporation) ultimately betrays the soldiers. 
37 The difference between monsters and humans exaggerates the imagery of race-difference
and defines the conflict as a race war. As quasi-insects the aliens are collectivist and
totalitarian (like Communists), and also primitive like the “savages” of the Frontier myth.
Like these enemies they are seen as lacking a moral sense and are guilty of extreme
cruelty.  They  reproduce  by  immobilizing  human  prey  and  implanting  eggs  in  their
bodies, which when they hatch destroy the host. The stakes of battle are therefore racial:
either they will rape and impregnate, not only our women but also our men, using our
bodies to breed their kind; or we will exterminate the brutes. 
38 The assignment of the hero’s role to a woman thus has a double significance. It registers
the rise of feminism, and the new role of women in the military. But it is also appropriate
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that both the hero and the Queen Monster are female, because the stakes in a race war
are reproduction or extermination. 
39 This lesson from the enemy is visualized when Ripley confronts the Queen monster in her
hatchery. Ripley has rescued a little girl, the last survivor of the colony. She confronts the
Queen, and through gestures with her gun suggests a treaty: if the Queen lets Ripley save
her child, Ripley will refrain from killing the Queen’s spawn. But then the instinct of race
preservation—and hatred—takes over. The monster’s eggs viscously swell, provoking an
enraged and disgusted Ripley to obliterate them, and then blast apart her enemy’s womb.
Her  rage,  and the  way  she  uses  her  weapon,  all  strongly  recall  the  “Sergeant  Dane
Moment” at the conclusion of Bataan. 
40 The deeper significance of the turn to science-fiction is that it revived in an acceptable
form the idea that racial enmity is the hallmark of the good war. The Platoon Movie
reconciled  racial  enmity  with  internal  brotherhood by  variations  on the  “race  face”
convention: our racially marked fellow-citizens or allies are seen approving of and joining
in the extermination of the racial enemy. In Aliens the android Bishop (as a non-human)
plays that role. Similar uses of the convention operate throughout the science fiction
genre; but it is most elaborately developed in the Star Trek series of television and movie
productions. Although never as popular as the Star Wars franchise, Star Trek productions
span a longer period of time (1966-present), and involve more sequels, prequels and spin-
offs than any comparable series. The original TV series indicated its affiliation with the
civil rights movement by fielding a racially integrated crew. Among the enemies that
unite  them  are  the  Klingons,  a  ruthless  warrior  race  visually  modeled  on  such
stereotyped movie villains as the Apache or the Mongols, and usually played by actors of
color. Other similarly intractable and physiologically marked enemies would emerge in
later versions of the series (the Romulans, the Borg, the Cardassians, the Founders). After
1979, as the writers became more aware of the racism implicit in this plot structure, they
developed  scripts  in  which  individuals  from  these  enemy  peoples  (Klingon,  Borg,
Cardassian)  become  part  of  the  Federation  “platoon.”  Yet  new  race  enemies  always
appear to threaten the Federation—as if to say that race wars are intrinsic to the natural
order.xxvi
 
Bad Wars Made Good: From Platoon to the First Gulf
War 1986-2000
41 1986—the year of Aliens—also saw the most significant real-war film of the period: Oliver
Stone’s Platoon. Stone’s title tries to assimilate Vietnam—the bad war, the unimaginable
war—to the Platoon Movie and the Good War. He follows classic form in the use of devices
like  the roll  call,  though  his  mix  emphasizes  race  and  social  class  rather  than  the
ethnicity of White soldiers.xxvii 
42 The  protagonist  is  Chris,  an  earnest  young  soldier,  who  is  troubled  by  the  conflict
between the moral and patriotic idealism that led him to enlist,  and the cruelty that
seems intrinsic to the military mission. The conflict is embodied in two sergeants: Barnes
(who  is  physically  deformed,  macho  and  morally  evil)  and  Elias—who  is  handsome,
slightly  effeminate  and  Christ-like.  The  two  are  framed  as  representatives  of  larger
cultural divisions in US society. Barnes’s supporters are bigots, red-necks and boot-lickers
—they drink whiskey. Elias’s people are counter-culture types, racially integrated rebels
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who wear peace medals and smoke dope. Barnes represents the dark side of America’s
intervention in Vietnam: he and his cohorts are more than willing to kill women and
children—to  perpetrate  My  Lai.  Elias  represents  the  idealism  that  led  America  to
intervene, chastened by a war gone tragically wrong. 
43 Stone takes up the most challenging element of the Vietnam story, by staging a village
invasion that nearly escalates into another My-Lai massacre—a brilliant and disturbing
sequence  which  shows  how the  rage  and fear  generated  by  guerrilla  war  can  make
American boys (including our hero) capable of committing such atrocities. Stone speaks
to the real trauma of Vietnam by identifying the evil intrinsic to our side of the war. But
he embodies it in Barnes, a character marked by conjoined (and repellent) physical and
cultural  differences,  which  are  the  stigmata  of  the  science-fiction  monster  and  the
hallmarks of racial difference. And having powerfully evoked the dark side of American
heroism, Stone purges it by a symbolic exorcism of the “monster.” Barnes kills Elias, and
Chris kills Barnes in the wake of an apocalyptic napalm fire-storm (the “Sergeant Dane
Moment”). 
44 The success of Stone’s exorcism made it possible for Hollywood to make new films about
Vietnam, including Hamburger  Hill and Stanley Kubrick’s  Full  Metal  Jacket (both 1987).
There was also a TV series, “Tour of Duty.” The platoons in these films follow Stone’s
pattern: White ethnic differences are no longer emphasized, and Blacks and Latinos make
up nearly half the unit. Race has completely replaced ethnicity as the source of significant
internal division; and the enemy is still marked by an “inhuman” ferocity and fanaticism. 
45 Hollywood’s essays in the war imaginary were increasingly responsive to the renewed
militancy in American policy promulgated by the Reagan administration. Echoes of Star
Wars informed Reagan’s identification of the USSR as the “Evil Empire,” and his “Space
Defense Initiative,” nicknamed “Star Wars,” was as much fiction as science. Reagan was
determined to expand the armed forces and to persuade Congress and the public  to
accept a wider scope for military action. But his military actions were tentative essays in
war-making,  constrained by Vietnam Syndrome.  These included covert  operations  in
Central  America,  limited  interventions  in  Grenada  and  Lebanon,  which  mixed  small
successes and embarrassing setbacks. Nevertheless, the administrations of Reagan and of
his successor, George H. W. Bush, did substantially advance the recuperation of the war
imaginary. 
46 Hollywood assisted them. As John Bacevich shows in The New American Militarism, after
1985 there was a significant amount of direct contact,  conversation, and consultation
between policy makers and film makers. Hollywood began to glorify the new military—
especially the Top Guns of air power and the special-ops professionals of Delta Force—and
to pit them against a new enemy: the Islamic terrorist, usually identified as “Libyans” (in
response  to  the  Gaddhafi  regime’s  sponsorship  of  airline  sabotage)  or  Iranians  (in
response to the hostage-taking of 1979-80). Here was an enemy Hollywood could readily
imagine:  non-White  and “savage”  (like  the  Apaches,  the  Japanese,  the  Red Chinese),
ideologically fanatical  (like Communists or Nazis);  an implacable enemy who can’t be
negotiated with,  only killed.  Delta Force (1985) was the first of several films to depict
imaginary commando raids  against  Muslim terrorists  holding US hostages.  The third
Rambo film took its  hero from rescuing POWs in Vietnam to  rescuing Americans  in
Afghanistan (1988). Navy SEALS followed the pattern in 1990. These films linked the rescue
theme of the MIA movies to the newly identified Muslim enemy. But while they were
naturalistic in style, like Aliens they depicted fantasy operations.xxviii 
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47 The opportunity for translating the fantasy into real-world military action would come
with the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. With
the  US  seemingly  triumphant  in  the  Cold  War,  American neoconservatives  began to
project a wider field for the use of military power to further American interests and
political ideals. Between 1989 and 1991, they developed a strategic doctrine which called
for the United States to achieve and maintain a military pre-eminence “so overwhelming
that no country would dream of ever becoming a rival…Thus the United States would be
the world’s lone superpower not just today or ten years from now but permanently.” That
power should be used not only to maintain international order, but to shape it according
to American principles,  transforming and regenerating the politics  and economics of
former adversaries like Russia, and of failed, failing or “rogue” states in Latin America,
Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, the political and moral constraints that had
limited the scope of US military action no longer applied. The new superpower was now
free—and must feel free—to act unilaterally, outside of and even in spite of the United
Nations or our formal alliances.xxix 
48 The neoconservatives’ way of imagining the conflicts we might face in this new world
order reflected the same paradox that had informed the imaginary race-wars in 1977-90
movies:  the unity of  a racially and ethnically diverse America was dependent on the
menace  of  a  racially  defined  Other.  Movies  could  ameliorate  the  contradiction
symbolically, or hold it in balance, through such devices as the “race face” convention.
But  the  exigencies  of  real-world  politics  required  a  more  rigorous  and  consistent
ideology;  and  the  neoconservatives  who  would  shape  that  ideology  joined  with
Republican Party polemicists to shift the balance toward racialism. 
49 Although opposition  to  racial  and  gender  discrimination  was  nominally  a  consensus
position,  since  the  1980s  the  Republican  Party  had  built  its  electoral  strength  by
exploiting the so-called White Backlash against civil rights and the War on Poverty. The
1990s saw a movement among conservative intellectuals to recuperate the intellectual
foundations  of  racism,  in  order  to  justify  dismantling  the  War  on  Poverty  and  re-
imposing racial  restrictions on immigration.  For example:  in 1994 sociologist  Charles
Murray’s Bell Curve became a bestseller, and center of a national debate, by arguing that
differences in White and Black academic performance were biologically based. In 1996
Peter  Brimelow,  editor  of  Forbes magazine,  published Alien  Nation (also a  best-seller),
which urged a ban on non-White immigrants, on the ground that they could never be
fully Americanized.xxx 
50 As in 1920 the exacerbation of domestic racism and xenophobia went hand in hand with
the racialization of foreign enemies. Samuel Huntington’s Conflict of  Civilizations (1993)
developed a geo-strategic theory in which differences in national culture are effectively
immutable,  like the differences attributed to racial  biology.  In Fouad Ajami’s  phrase,
Huntington’s “civilizations” are always “whole and intact, watertight under an eternal
sky.” Huntington theorizes that those differences must inevitably pit the West against the
civilizations of Islam, the Slavic nations, and the Orient. His work would become the bible
of  neo-conservative  geopolitics.  Huntington’s  work also  reflects  the foreign/domestic
feedback loop in racialist thinking: in Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National
Identity (2005) he would urge an end to Latino immigration, on the ground that Latino
culture is inimical to American civilization.xxxi 
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51 But the war imaginary requires not only the sense of an enemy, but belief in the efficacy
of  heroic  (i.e.  military)  action.  Fantasy  wars  might  prepare  the  public  mind for  the
possibility of action, but validation of the war imaginary requires real-world testing. 
52 The first President Bush used military force to overthrow the Noriega regime in Panama
in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992 and—above all—organized the first Gulf War in
1991. The latter was the largest US military action since Vietnam, and it was framed to
meet all the criteria of the Good War: the enemy a brutal dictator, guilty of aggression;
the United States part of a multi-national (multi-racial) coalition; a stand-up fight and not 
a bug-hunt. At the end the administration explicitly declared that with this victory the
United  States  had  cured  itself  of  Vietnam  Syndrome,  and  regained  its  faith  in  the
regenerative moral and political effects of warfare.xxxii 
53 The  change  in  attitude  was  enduring.  Neoconservatives  considered  Clinton’s  foreign
policy “weak,” largely because of his decision to withdraw US troops from Somalia after
the “Black Hawk Down” incident.  Nevertheless,  his  administration was also assertive
about the efficacy of military force. It was Clinton’s push (over European objections) for
intervention in the Balkan civil  wars that  produced the sci-fi  inflected nostrum that
“Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus.”xxxiii 
54 Neo-conservative doctrine would be most fully and dramatically asserted by President
George W. Bush and his administration—their beliefs caricatured by Karl Rove’s infamous
assertion that criticism of the Iraq War by “the reality-based community” was irrelevant,
because “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Yet similar
thinking had prevailed in the Clinton administration, as evidenced by Secretary of State
Madeleine  Albright’s  1998  statement:  “If  we  have  to  use  force,  it  is  because  we  are
America! We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall, we see further into the future.”
xxxiv The hubristic spirit of this world-view is perhaps best captured by the science-fiction
epic, Independence Day (1996),  in which the US leads an international military alliance
against alien space invaders.  The defeat of the aliens produces a new world order of
peace, under American auspices, and the fourth of July becomes Independence Day for
the entire human race. 
55 The recovery of the war imaginary by policy makers was paralleled and reinforced by the
revival of the “Good War” myth in its most literal form.xxxv This development was marked
by  the  publication  of  Tom  Brokaw’s  best-seller,  The  Greatest  Generation,  and  Steven
Spielberg’s  Saving  Private  Ryan,  both  in  1998.  Brokaw’s  book  celebrates  the  heroic
achievements of the generation that survived the Depression, carried out the New Deal,
won the Second World War, created a broad-based middle-class society, and extended
civil  rights  across  the  color  line.  The  film  reduces  this  list  of  achievements  to  the
symbolic  shorthand  of  the  Platoon  Movie—a  vague  notion  of  fighting  for  the  good
American life, which includes modest prosperity, family, tolerance, “democracy.” 
56 The movie centers on a rescue mission—the kind sanctified by the POW-rescue films. It
also returns us to the racially segregated army of the 1940s: the American platoon is all-
White, though ethnically mixed. And though it deals with an old victory, the movie ends
with “unfinished business”—the Greatest Generation has set a standard of service and
sacrifice that those who come after must aspire to and struggle to meet, by being willing
to fight a Good War when their country calls. That summons was implicit in the wave of
Good War films the followed Ryan, over the next decade, including (for example) the HBO
series Band of Brothers, Windtalkers, and Flags of Our Fathers. 
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57 The other new element in 1990s cinema was treatment of the Gulf War itself. Courage
Under  Fire (1996)  follows  through  on  the  premise  of  Aliens:  after  ethnic  and  racial
integration,  women join the platoon.  More interesting is  Three Kings (1999),  in which
cynical American commandos learn sympathy for the Iraqi Shiites, who were abandoned
to Saddam Hussein when Bush, Sr. refused to seek total victory in the Gulf war. This
“unfinished business” is bequeathed to Bush’s successors; and it reappears in the thinking
of neoconservatives within the George W. Bush administration—led by Dick Cheney and
Paul Wolfowitz—who were seeking a pretext for invading Iraq in 2002.xxxvi
58 Their preparation for that invasion included the viewing of Black Hawk Down. 
 
Black Hawk Down: The Enemy’s Lesson
59 All of the major tendencies in post-Vietnam war films reach a consummation in Black
Hawk Down. By invoking the conventions developed in these films, Black Hawk arouses and
satisfies a set of expectations that enable the American viewer of 2002 to identify with the
story, and to accept its message. Moreover, the film presents itself not as fiction, but as
reproduction of actual events—which gives its interpretation great authority.
60 The film begins by describing the Somalia mission as a humanitarian effort to rescue
starving Black people from a cruel warlord, Muhammad Farah Aidid. In this it follows the
ideological premises laid down in Bataan back in 1943, in Cold War era films set in Korea,
in Aliens and Star Trek, and echoed most recently in Three Kings: that the United States acts
to  protect  “natives”  from  monstrous  dictators.  The  action  begins  with  a  successful
commando raid (as in the 1980s Delta Force and Navy SEALs); but when a helicopter is shot
down,  the mission changes  to  a  last  stand defense,  and the film becomes a detailed
account of the desperate effort to rescue the besieged Americans. This shift to the defensive
was also used in World War II era films like Guadalcanal Diary (1943) and Objective Burma
(1945), or Korean War films like Retreat, Hell! (1952) and All the Young Men (1960), to show
that even when Americans take the offensive, their war is ultimately a defensive one.
Now, after Vietnam, the shift more strongly references the premise of the POW rescue
films—that the most immaculate mission is the rescue of one’s own people. 
61 The corollary is, “and the natives be damned.” To achieve the rescue, the Americans will
have to shoot their way through streets crowded with civilians as well as armed enemies.
The film enables us to accept or consent to that kind of violence by treating Somalis in
general as an alien race. 
62 We first see the Somalis as victims: a mob of starving Somalis swarm the trucks delivering
food, only to have it brazenly stolen by armed thugs of the warlord Aidid. These are the
people  the  Americans  and  their  allies  have  come  to  rescue.  However,  the  film also
distances the Somalis from their benefactors, visually and emotionally: no Americans are
present when the food is delivered, the encounter is Black-on-Black; and the Americans
also refer  to the Somalis  as  “the Skinnies,”  an implicitly  mocking reference to their
starving condition and to their characteristically tall, lean physiques. 
63 That emotional distancing proves justified as the Somali crowds seem to morph, without
warning  or  transition,  into  ferocious  assailants  of  the  American Rangers—as  if  their
apparent victimhood was a snare to draw us into an ambush. Like the enemy in the anti-
terrorist films of the 80s, Somalis are Muslim. Like the Comaches or Apaches in a Western,
they are seen as hyper-violent primitives. Like the Asian enemies of WW II and Korea, and
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the “bugs” in Aliens,  they are mono-racial and fanatical in attacking—careless of their
own losses. Like the enemy in Vietnam films, even their women and children try to kill
Americans. But most strikingly, the enemy are all Blacks, whereas the opening roll calls
show that the American units are all but exclusively White—just as they were in Private
Ryan. There are only two Black soldiers in all the American units represented in the film,
only one in an important role—a ratio far smaller than was attempted back in 1943 in
Bataan (when the army was segregated) or in Pork Chop Hill in 1960. 
64 This casting decision has been justified on the ground that there were in fact only two
African-Americans in the units that fought in Mogadishu—a proportion not typical of
Ranger units in general. But the movie is not a documentary. Like Bataan and Pork Chop
Hill it  is  a historical  fiction.  Decisions about how to represent race in such films are
artistic—and  ideological—decisions.  In  Pork  Chop  Hill,  for  example,  several  Black
characters appear, in both major and secondary roles, although the book on which the
movie  was  based  never  mentions  the  presence  of  Black  soldiers.  This reflects  the
producers’ deliberate intention to use Cold War conflict to frame a reconsideration of
racial  discrimination.xxxvii Director  Ridley  Scott’s  decisions  reflect  a  different  set  of
priorities. He is defining the terms of a new kind of war against Islamic terrorism. The
menace  of  that  war  is  conveyed  by  the  aesthetic  force  inherent  in  the  stark  visual
opposition of Blacks and Whites, which (intentionally or not) also exploits the emotional
charge of racial stereotyping. 
65 It is critical to note that Black Hawk Down does not use the race-face device to moderate
racial distinctions. On the contrary, late in the film the lone Black infantryman in the
American unit freezes instead of shooting when a Black Somali woman runs toward the
troops’ position—despite the evidence, given throughout the film, that she is likely to be
an armed enemy. Indeed, the woman does pull a rifle from her dress, and a White soldier
has to shoot her. This scene is one invented for the movie—it is a fiction and not the re-
enactment of a particular event. If one reads it allegorically, the film is dramatizing the
idea that the Black man can’t be trusted in war against a Black enemy. Put that together
with the decision to minimize the number of Blacks on the American side and the film
seems to be reverting to the vision of America as a White Republic.xxxviii 
66 The movie also dehumanizes the enemy by visually associating them with the monsters in
Aliens. (Scott directed the first movie in the Alien series.) The Somalis in Black Hawk Down
swarm in masses through the narrow streets and alleys, just as the monsters swarmed
through the tunnels of the space colony in Aliens. In both films, the enemy’s final attack
on the American defenses is first detected by the swarming of blips on a radar screen. So
when the moment of berserk killing comes—the Sergeant Dane moment—the audience
accepts the firestorm as an appropriate response to the massed monsters. 
67 However, the firestorm in Mogadishu does not complete the mission. It only allows the
troops to escape. By the conventions of the genre, the film’s “unfinished business” would
be to avenge the defeat, and destroy the warlord. This idea is reinforced by a scene in
which one of the warlord’s men articulates the conventional “enemy’s lesson”:
In Somalia, killing is negotiation. Do you really think if you get General Aidid, we
will simply put down our weapons and adopt American democracy? That the killing
will stop? We know this: without victory there can be no peace. There will always
be killing.
68 The enemy’s lesson—as always—is that victory can only be achieved through merciless
violence. 
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69 Instead,  the  violence  which  might  have  produced  a  “regeneration”  of  America’s
commitment to making the world safe for democracy is rendered pointless by the Clinton
administration’s decision to withdraw from Somalia. The expectations roused by the use
of Platoon Movie conventions are frustrated. The viewers will leave the theater haunted
and angered by a humiliating defeat, so reminiscent of Vietnam—denied the prospect
that defeat will be revenged, the loss made good. Which is, of course, just another way of
entailing “unfinished business” on the audience. 
70 Bush’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and our embrace of Dick Cheney’s “dark side” in the
Global War on Terror, would provide the sequel in which Black Hawk Down would get a
proper symbolic resolution. 
 
Conclusion
71 If I am right in thinking that the Platoon Movie formula embodies an operative American
mythology, then in the decades since Vietnam, American films have done the ideological
work of the neo-conservatives,  by developing a symbolism that is capable of winning
public consent to military intervention. The recuperation of the war imaginary, and of
belief in the morally and politically regenerative power of military violence required, at
every stage, the racializing of the enemy to represent them as by nature hostile to our
“civilization,” and beyond an appeal to reason. Bush may have psyched himself up for
war  by  replaying  the  White-against-Black  scenario  of  Black  Hawk  Down;  but  he,  and
Americans in general, had been educated to recognize and respond to the new Islamic
enemy by Delta Force and Aliens and Three Kings and Independence Day. 
72 The racialization of the external enemy draws on, and revivifies, the racialist ideas and
antipathies that are endemic to American culture. In the aftermath of World War I, that
feedback loop led to  a  decade of  intensified racial  discrimination.  World War II  was
exceptional  because  it  reversed  the  pattern,  using  anti-Nazi  ideology  to  foster  the
movement for racial civil rights. Since the Reagan administration, our political culture
has turned on the contradiction between two aspects of the Platoon Movie Myth. On the
one hand, it is now expected that political and cultural spokespersons will affirm the
principle that racial and ethnic inclusion, and fair play for all, is the American Way. On
the other, the Republican Party has built its considerable power at both the state and the
national level by exploiting the racial prejudices and xenophobia of anxious working- and
middle-class Whites, especially in the Southern and Great Plains states. 
73 It is still an open question whether the failure of our latest wars will break the feedback
loop or intensify it. Indeed, the current (2016) presidential campaign suggests that the
contradictions  reconciled in  the  Platoon Movie  Myth are  breaking apart.  Within the
Republican Party we see the re-emergence of overt racism and xenophobia as motivators
of  a  new populist  hyper-nationalism;  while  the Democratic  Party presents  itself  as  a
“platoon” of ethnic, racial and identity groups, banded together in defense of civil rights
and  cultural  liberalism—though  not  necessarily  for  the  achievement  of  a  national
“mission,” whether war or its moral equivalent in a New Deal or Great Society. Neither
tendency can, by itself, restore the link between social justice and nationalism that once
shaped American ideology.xxxix 
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ABSTRACTS
While preparing the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President Bush invited his advisors to screenings of
Black Hawk Down (2002). “Bush . . . told his aides that America’s hasty exit from Somalia after 18
soldiers died in the 1993 raid made famous in the movie .  .  .  emboldened America’s terrorist
enemies” to attack us on September 11. This study explains the ideological force of Black Hawk
Down by framing it as the culmination of developments in American national mythology, and the
mass culture genres that carry it. The “Platoon Movie” developed during WW II propagated a
new myth of multi-ethnic American nationality, and a “war imaginary” which figures WW II as
the “Good War.” That myth was discredited by defeat in Vietnam; but starting in 1980, American
war films, and war-themed science fiction films, seconded the work of neo-conservative policy
makers to recuperate the “war imaginary.” This entailed a sharpening of racialist interpretations
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